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Abstract 
This chapter focuses on the innovative public practices of capturing land value in 
urban development (i.e. public-value capturing). There are significant differences 
between England, Spain (region of Valencia) and the Netherlands. The English and 
especially the Spanish/Valencian public bodies manage to transfer the bill for paying 
and/or providing public infrastructure to property developers. Public infrastructure 
refers to: public roads and space, sewerage, public facilities and buildings, affordable 
and social housing, etc. In addition, the English and Spanish/Valencian public bodies 
manage to capture part of the value increase that accrues from re-zoning land. This 
contributes to the public budget and helps to improve the quality and quantity of 
public infrastructure. These differences among the countries are mainly the result of 
differences in their planning system: first the level of certainty about future development 
possibilities before negotiations between developers and local planning bodies take 
place; and second whether public bodies dispose of a land readjustment regulation to 
avoid dependence on private parties to provide the infrastructure. 
Keywords: Public-value capturing, urban development, public infrastructure, landownership, 
public-private, urban planning, Social and aﬀordable housing, land speculation, land 
readjustment.
*(*) This chapter is based on PhD research that I conducted ﬁrst at the Delft University of Technology and lately 
at the Radboud University, The Netherlands. The research was supported by the Dutch government (Habiforum 
Program Innovative Land Use) and the Delft University of Technology (Delft Centre for Sustainable Urban Areas), 
and has been published at the end of 2010 (‘Capturing value increase in urban redevelopment’, Sidestone Press). 
I also want to thank UN-Habitat, GLTN and the Amsterdam School of Real Estate (University of Amsterdam) for 
sponsoring my participation in October 2009 in the Conference in Warsaw that led to this contribution.
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11.1 INTRODUCTION
Public-value capturing may be considered one of the most important driving forces 
of public planning,  as public bodies hope to at 
least recover the costs of public infrastructure 
through the increase in land value. In 
urban development practice, public-value 
capturing usually takes place in the context 
of an agreement between public bodies 
(municipalities, public planning bodies, 
public development agencies, etc.), property 
developers and landowners. Under the notion 
of ‘public-value capturing’ there are various 
concepts, such as: ‘cost recovery’, ‘value 
capturing’ and ‘capturing betterment’. Cost 
recovery refers to the recovery of costs related 
to the construction of public infrastructure 
through contributions from private developers. 
They may contribute either by building this 
infrastructure directly or by paying the public 
bodies to do so. Value capturing is when public 
bodies that have invested in infrastructure 
capture the increased land and property values 
which result from that investment. Capturing 
betterment refers to a public body capturing 
the increased value that results from modifying 
the zoning plans and is irrespective of any 
incurred costs (Krabben & Needham, 2008: 
4; Needham, 2007: 175-178). 
There is much discussion about which of these 
forms of public-value capturing is legitimate, 
and there are relevant differences in the legal 
limits to public-value capturing between 
England, Spain and the Netherlands. England, 
due to the nationalisation of development 
rights introduced in 1947 and Spain since the 
Constitution of 1978, differ radically from 
the Netherlands regarding the right to the 
increase in value that accrues from re-zoning 
the land. In England, public bodies can tax 
the increased value, but nowadays this does 
not happen. Instead, what works in practice 
is a system of planning agreements that allows 
public bodies to charge property developers a 
(broad and increasingly previously defined) 
set of contributions, including contributions 
in money for infrastructure situated off-site 
(outside the development site).
In Spain public bodies have the right to a share 
in the increased value, which has translated 
into a right to a percentage of the serviced 
building plots, which landowners have to 
deliver for free. Contribution to the realisation 
and payment of the public infrastructure takes 
place within a strict predefined set of obligatory 
contributions and a land readjustment 
regulation that rules the distribution of 
the charges among the landowners and the 
developers. Contributions cover most of the 
costs of on-site public infrastructure (situated 
within the development site), and most of 
the land needed for off-site infrastructure. 
Additionally, there are also possibilities to agree 
to more contributions through negotiations. 
In 2008 the Netherlands confirmed the 
previous doctrine that the increased value 
belongs to the landowner solely. Dutch public 
bodies are authorised to charge less costs than 
the English and the Spanish (Muñoz, 2008).
This chapter aims to provide empirical 
evidence on innovative practices of public-
value capturing by first doing exploratory 
research in several Western European 
countries, and second by studying cases 
of urban regeneration on privately owned 
land in England, the Netherlands and the 
Spanish region of Valencia. Public bodies 
in England and especially in Valencia have 
managed: 1) to make developers provide the 
public infrastructure, either by paying for it 
or constructing it; and also 2) to capture part 
of the increased value. I will focus on two 
independent variables that are responsible 
for the majority of these differences. The first 
independent variable is flexibility in planning, 
i.e. the level of certainty about future 
development possibilities before negotiations 
between developers and local planning bodies 
take place. Since the 1980s in Spain and since 
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the 1990s in England, public bodies have 
been working towards increasing beforehand 
the certainty about the contributions that 
developers will have to provide, in kind (e.g. 
providing the infrastructure, building social 
housing) or in monetary funds (e.g. paying 
the municipality). This certainty stimulated 
the internalisation of these contributions in 
land prices and land development costs and 
resulted in an improvement of public-value 
capturing (Muñoz & Tassan-Kok, 2010).
 
The second independent variable deals with 
an important aspect of property rights in 
land, which is: are public bodies dependent 
on private parties when acquiring land, 
gathering financial means and providing the 
public infrastructure? There is debate in Spain 
and the Netherlands about the scope of the 
landowner’s rights and the availability of 
public law instruments to intervene. In the 
Spanish region of Valencia the debate led to 
the introduction in 1994 of a new type of land 
readjustment regulation that has had large 
positive effects on public-value capturing.
Section 2 ‘Method and data’ will summarise 
the methodology used for data gathering and 
analysis. Section 3 ‘International differences in 
public-value capturing’ will provide an analysis 
of the degree of public-value capturing in each 
country. Sections 4 ‘Flexibility in planning’ 
and 5 ‘Property rights on land’ will provide 
an analysis of the two variables that seem to 
explain international differences. Finally, 
Section 6 will draw conclusions on the possible 
implications of the findings. 
11.2 METHOD AND DATA
A fundamental question in case-based research 
is whether the findings are valid. Central here 
are the concepts of ‘internal validity’ (i.e. can 
the findings explain the studied cases?) and 
‘external validity’ (i.e. can the findings be 
generalised to other cases?). 
This chapter mainly bases its conclusions 
on data from an explorative research in nine 
European Union countries and on several cases 
of urban regeneration in three of them: four 
cases in Spain (Valencia), three in England and 
four in the Netherlands.1 Internal validity was 
confirmed by a combination of five strategies: 
1) Maintaining the context as constant as 
possible to reduce the risk of spurious third 
variables:
t We studied countries with somewhat 
similar political, economic and social 
contexts to the Dutch context, all of 
them EU members: the UK, Spain, 
Germany, France, Italy, Flanders 
(Belgium), Denmark and Sweden.
t The cases show similarities in terms 
of landownership situation (privately 
owned land), the need for significant 
public infrastructure, and an important 
value increase of the land due to re-
zoning. 
2) Maximising the variance in the independent 
variable, i.e. electing those countries and 
cases that show the broadest variance in 
the independent variables ‘Flexibility’ and 
‘Property rights’, and seeing what happens in 
the dependent variable ‘public-value capturing’ 
(Polit e.a., 2001: 188-192; Swanborn, 1996: 
62-64): 
t Of the nine countries, Spain and the 
UK were selected for in-depth research 
because they showed the widest 
variation in the level of flexibility and 
in the definition of property rights 
1 Of the four Valencian urban regeneration projects, three are 
located in the city of Valencia (‘Guillem de Anglesola, 1.2 ha; 
‘Periodista Gil Sumbiela’, 0.6 ha; ‘Camino Hondo del Grao’, 5.7 ha) 
and one in the city of Alicante (‘Benalúa Sur’, 8 ha). The three English 
projects are located in the city of Bristol: ‘Harbourside/Canon’s 
Marsh’ (7.8 ha), ‘Temple Quay’ (7.4 ha) and ‘Megabowl’ (1.3 ha). 
The four Dutch cases are located in the cities of Amsterdam (‘De 
Funen’, 8 ha), Eindhoven (‘Kruidenbuurt Noord’, 17 ha), Groningen 
(‘Kop van Oost’, 5 ha) and Breda (‘Stationskwartier’, 16 ha).
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in land. Thanks to this variance, the 
likelihood increases that a possible 
causal relationship with the public-
value capturing variable becomes 
visible. We focused on England (and 
not on the UK) and the region of 
Valencia (and not Spain) because of 
differences in planning law among the 
different British constituent countries 
respectively as among the different 
Spanish regions;
t In the selected three countries we chose 
cases that showed innovative features in 
the independent variables. 
3) Repeated measurement: It was possible to 
apply this strategy for the data gathering in 
Valencia: here a new planning law in 1994 
introduced important changes in independent 
variable property rights (see section 5), while 
the context (i.e. the potential third spurious 
variables like culture, public policies, financial 
situation of the municipalities, developments 
in the real estate markets) remained the same. 
Because of the lack of available dossiers of 
suitable cases in the period before 1995, this 
research had to limit the data gathering for 
that period to literature and interviews. For 
the period after 1995, besides literature and 
interviews, this research included research on 
four cases.
4) Checking for other variables: We 
systematically checked a list of possible third 
spurious variables: personal circumstances of 
those involved, political circumstances and 
market price of real estate.
5) The external validity (generalisability of the 
research findings to other cases) was also the 
goal of diverse strategies. Without a reasonable 
degree of external validity, the findings in this 
chapter would run the risk of being supported 
by overly specific cases. 
Several strategies have been taken in order 
to be able to claim that what happens in 
the studied cases is not an exception and 
somehow stands for other urban regeneration 
cases in the three countries studied and other 
European countries: 
First we selected cases that in some way stand 
for the main sorts of urban regeneration 
projects (see Table 11.1).
To further increase the external validity of the 
findings, other sources of more or less general 
knowledge have been analyzed: 
t Data has been sought about other cases. 
Sometimes there was quite generalisable 
data available, especially in Valencia and 
England;
t Interviews with experts, who gave 
information about other cases they 
know. 
The case-based findings have systematically 
been positioned within this more general 
knowledge. This has allowed assessing their 
degree of external validity. 
England and the Spanish region of Valencia 
were selected because they show clear 
exceptional features in the independent 
variables. Together with the Netherlands, 
these three countries offer a wide variance. 
This makes the studied countries more 
representative as examples of the different 
values that the independent variables can 
assume. Many countries show characteristics 
situated in between this variance.
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BOX 11.1 OVERVIEW OF SOME OF THE CASE STUDIES
Regeneration of Harbourside Canon’s Marsh, Bristol, England. This site comprises 7.8ha 
of land forming the last and largest part of the regeneration of a former dockland. Planning 
permission became definitive in 2003 with the sealing of a Development Agreement. Initially 
60% of the land was privately owned, the rest was owned by the City Council of Bristol. 
Work on infrastructure provision commenced in 2004. By June 2007 more than half of the 
development had been delivered or was under construction, and the first buildings were 
already occupied and in use. 
Regeneration of Kop van Oost, Groningen, Netherlands. This site comprises 5ha of vacant 
land with 60% owned by the former user, a wood-processing company. After negotiations 
with the municipality, the land has been re-sold twice to commercial developers. Negotiations 
with the final developer crystallised in 2005 in a Development Agreement. The plan was 
definitively approved in 2006, including 430 dwellings, most of them apartments, and about 
4,000 m² commercial space. In October 2007 infrastructure provision was ongoing.
Regeneration of Benalúa Sur, Alicante, Spain. In 1998 the owners of 60% of the land, led 
by a small consultancy group that owned 15% of the land, submitted a proposal to rezone 
the site (8ha, empty plots, some decrepit housing and several industries) into residential and 
some commercial space. In 2004, the Development Agreement was signed and the detailed 
land-use plan became definitive. It included about 600 apartments plus some offices and 
retail space. By 2007 a commercial developer had bought an important share of the land and 
work had begun on the provision of infrastructure. 
Regeneration of Guillem de Anglesola, Valencia, Spain This project comprised 1.2ha of 
land and included the demolition of old and decrepit housing and the construction of a main 
road flanked by about 125 new apartments. A commercial developer submitted a proposal in 
1999 and becoming the urbanising agent in 2005 after public tender, negotiations and the 
signing of a Development Agreement. The developer had bought almost all of the land by 
the end of the land readjustment procedure in 2008, at which time infrastructure provision 
had not yet begun.
TABLE 11.1 SELECTED URBAN REGENERATION CASES IN ENGLAND, SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS
VALENCIA ENGLAND THE NETHERLANDS
Multifunctional 
central areas
Guillem de Anglesola and 
Periodista Gil Sumbiela
Temple Quay Stationskwartier
Monofunctional 
residential areas
Guillem de Anglesola and part 
of Benalúa Sur
(*) Kruidenbuurt
Old brown-ﬁeld 
sites
Periodista Gil Sumbiela, 
Camino Hondo and part of 
Benalúa Sur
Megabowl and 
Harbourside
De Funen and 
Kop van Oost
Multifunctional central areas consist of city/town central areas and sites around railway stations 
Monofunctional residential areas consist of districts with a predominant residential use.                                                                             
Old brownﬁeld sites are derelict sites: business and other sorts of economic-industrial activities; gas 
and electricity factories; harbour areas; railway infrastructure; and hospitals, government buildings and 
military sites.                                                                                                                                                                     
(*) It was not possible to ﬁnd a case in England that would ﬁt within this category.
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11.3 INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN 
PUBLIC-VALUE CAPTURING
When comparing the three countries, there 
seem to be clear differences in public-value 
capturing. The differences mainly involve 
(Muñoz, 2008; see Table 11.2):
t On-site infrastructure provision 
costs: in England and Valencia these are 
mostly or fully paid by the developers, 
while the Netherlands has large public 
subsidies; 
t Land for on-site public infrastructure: 
in Valencia this is provided for free by 
the landowners, while England and the 
Netherlands used to have a much larger 
public contribution for providing this 
land;
t Social housing: in England and 
Valencia they are paid to a large extent 
or almost fully by the developers, while 
in the Netherlands this is covered 
primarily by municipalities and housing 
associations;
t Public infrastructure located off-
site or on-site but servicing a much 
larger area: in England and Valencia 
developers contribute significantly (in 
England primarily with financial means 
while in Valencia primarily with land). 
In the Netherlands these contributions 
are very rare;
t Capturing increased value: local 
public bodies in Valencia capture a 
significant share, even if they own no 
land. In England public bodies do not 
profit officially but because of the broad 
definition of developers’ contributions 
one might conclude the contrary. In 
the Netherlands public bodies capture 
increased value only in case they own 
the land and/or invest and share the 
risks.
The next sections analyse possible explanations 
for these large differences. Why is public-value 
capturing the highest in Valencia, lower but 
also high in England, and relatively- speaking 
very low in the Netherlands?
11.4 FLEXIBILITY IN PLANNING
In this chapter we define flexibility as the 
room for change and alteration in zoning 
prescriptions during the planning process. 
Thischapter focuses on one specific aspect: the 
level of certainty about the future development 
possibilities, related to the period in which 
public bodies and developers negotiate the 
terms within which development of the site 
may take place. 
Certainty depends on whether legally binding 
zoning plans (e.g. land-use plans, planning 
permission) and indicative zoning plans (e.g. 
development plans) come into force before or 
after the negotiations, and on the contents of 
these documents. 
This chapter makes a distinction between two 
sub-variables (types of certainty): certainty 
about building possibilities (what, where and 
how the landowner will be allowed to build), 
and certainty about future contributions (how 
much the landowner will have to contribute, 
in kind or in money).
Negative effect of certainty about building 
possibilities
In England, Spain and the Netherlands, local 
public bodies usually create certainty in the 
early stages, to different degrees, about future 
building possibilities. In Spain the certainty 
is the highest, and this happens through 
the approval of General Land-use Plans, 
obligatory documents for each Municipality 
that must cover the whole municipal territory 
and include detailed prescriptions (see Figures 
11.1 and 11.4). This document is legally 
binding, which means that it provides legal 
rights to citizens and landowners. For example, 
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TABLE 11.2 COMPARISON OF RESULTS OF PUBLIC-VALUE CAPTURING: WHO PAYS WHAT IN 
ENGLAND, VALENCIA AND THE NETHERLANDS?
ENGLAND NETHERLANDS VALENCIA
On-site 
infrastructure 
provision 
costs
Developer Almost all the costs Part of the costs
All or almost all 
these costs
Public 
bodies
Indirect through 
providing cheap 
land or cheap 
ﬁnancing.
Heavy subsidies No
Land needed 
for on-site 
public 
infrastructure
Developer Most of the land
Important part of the 
land
Almost all the land
Public 
bodies
Part of the land
Important part of the 
land
Not much land, 
only that land that 
was already public 
infrastructure
Land needed 
for on-site 
public 
buildings
Developer Part of the land
Commercial developer 
none; housing 
association eventually
Almost all the land
Public 
bodies
Part of the land Most of the land
Not much land, 
only that land that 
was already public 
infrastructure
On-site 
public 
buildings
Developer Not often
Commercial developer 
none; housing 
association eventually
Sometimes
Public 
bodies
Almost always Almost always Almost always
Affordable 
housing
Developer
Increasing amount 
of affordable and 
social housing
Only housing 
corporations 
contribute, 
Commercial 
developers don’t
Almost all
Public 
bodies
Partly Sometimes
Some minor object 
subsidies
Contributions to off-site 
public infrastructure & 
facilities
Developers 
contribute 
signiﬁcantly, 
increasingly in the 
last years.
Developers almost do 
not contribute at all to 
public infrastructure/ 
facilities outside plan 
area, and modestly to 
infra/facilities situated 
within but serving 
wider area.
Landowners 
cede signiﬁcant 
quantities of land, 
and sometimes pay 
the construction of 
these infrastructure 
and facilities.
Capturing betterment In principle, no None
Landowners 
transfer for free 
10% of the 
building volume in 
green-ﬁeld sites, 
and often pay 
money
Grey: Country in which the developer/landowner contributes the most of the three countries.    
Brown: Country in which the developer/landowner contributes the second most of the three.   
Light brown: Country in which the developer/landowner contributes the least.
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if this document foresees a building on plot 
X, but afterwards the Municipality decides 
to change the plan to diminish or eliminate 
the building, the landowner has right to full 
compensation for the value of the building as 
prescribed in the first plan, even if he had not 
yet constructed it.
In England and the Netherlands, local 
public bodies usually approve indicative, 
BOX 11.2 GENERAL LAND-USE PLANS AND THE CASE OF VALENCIA
In the region of Valencia, as in the rest of Spain, municipalities are obliged by law to approve 
a legally binding General Land-use Plan. Early in the development process this General 
Plan prescribes future development possibilities, both in green-field and urban regeneration 
sites. Figure 1 shows two maps belonging to the 1988 General Land-use Plan of the city of 
Valencia. The left map zones those sites to be developed in the near future, the right map 
those to be developed in the longer term. Nowadays the prescriptions of this document are 
almost all implemented, and the Municipality is working towards a new General Plan. This 
General Plan prescribes the following:
t It zones land into: (i) existing urban land; (ii) Land to be developed or redeveloped in the 
future, soon or in the longer term; and (iii) Non-developable land or rural area;
t Prescribes possible building typologies, maximum number of dwellings and sometimes a 
maximum floor space index (how many m² floor space can be build per m² land);
t Logical phasing of development;
t Main public infrastructure as main roads and parks, new university, etc;
t Land-use determinations for non-developable land;
t Zones land into building regulation zones (e.g. historic city, urban extension, etc). 
In green-field sites to be developed in the near future, and in urban regeneration sites, General 
Plans also prescribe detailed regulations, as height and delimitation of buildings, draft of 
public infrastructure, etc. In the four cases, the General Plan did indeed prescribe detailed 
regulations, including the alignment and height of the buildings and a maximum number 
of m² floor space. Usually, these prescriptions remain unchanged and become effectively 
implemented, or with minor modifications. However, this is not always the case. There is 
the possibility of modifying structural elements, after an extensive public procedure, which 
happened in two of the four studied cases. 
FIGURE 11.1 GENERAL LAND-USE PLAN OF THE CITY OF VALENCIA - 1988
not legally binding plans, which create some 
certainty. Examples of these documents in the 
Netherlands include Nota van Uitgangspunten, 
Stedenbouwkundig Plan/Visie; and in 
England, Local Plans, Development Plans. 
These documents are not legally binding, 
meaning that the final plan can easily diverge 
from them. In addition, these documents 
used to be very vague and general in their 
determinations (see Figures 11.2 and 11.3).
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FIGURE 11.2 REGENERATION OF HARBOURSIDE/CANON’S MARSH, BRISTOL, ENGLAND
BOX 11.3 REGENERATION OF HARBOURSIDE/CANON’S MARSH  - CASE STUDY VARIABLES
First variable: flexibility in planning 
The 1997 Bristol Local Plan zoned the entire site as a ‘Major regeneration area’, with offices, 
leisure/tourist activities, and housing (about 200 dwellings). In 1998 the Council approved a 
Planning Brief that augmented the number of dwellings to 400. However, these documents 
are of indicative character, which means that they can be changed without extensive procedure, 
and also that they do not create any right for the landowners. The Council could in theory 
decide to diminish the building possibilities without this giving to the landowner the right 
to compensation for the lost virtual building possibilities. After negotiations, the 2003 
Planning Permission augmented the total number of dwellings from 400 to 700. The 1998 
Planning Brief prescribed also the obligations likely to be paid, including a cross-subsidy for 
the essential infrastructure and the council’s leisure objectives. Although this document did 
not prescribe any specific amount, it seems that it created enough clarity for the developer 
to assess, within a margin, the financial feasibility of the scheme. Nevertheless, this degree of 
certainty was relative. The Council could deviate from the document: for example, during 
the negotiations, the Council first added the requirement of 30% of affordable housing, to 
lower the percentage afterwards.
Second variable: Property rights 
The developer was not willing to comply with some requirements of the Council, contending 
that they threatened the financial feasibility of the operation. For example, the developer was 
against the requirement of constructing 30% social/affordable housing, finally accepting a 
9% requirement. 
Realised public-value capturing 
The developer pays most of the on-site public infrastructure, including roads, public space and 
expensive soil decontamination. The Council pays a minor part and the public programme 
English Partnership issues a cheap loan to the developer. In total 50% of the land will be used 
for any kind of public infrastructure, of which 3/5 are provided by the developer and 2/5 by 
the Council. The developer will build 9% social housing; of which half are rented units and 
half are affordable units to sell. In this he will bear a deficit. The developer pays €30.5 million 
to the Council for major leisure facilities in the neighbourhood and will also provide works 
to adjacent highways costing between €2 and €7 million. 
Sources: Maps live; Report from the Head of Bristol Planning Services to Bristol Local Council Committee, 2001. 
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FIGURE 11.3 REGENERATION OF KOP VAN OOST, CITY OF GRONINGEN, NETHERLANDS
BOX 11.4 REGENERATION OF KOP VAN OOST, CITY OF GRONINGEN, NETHERLANDS - CASE 
STUDY VARIABLES
First variable: flexibility in planning
Here several indicative plans preceded the signing of the Development Agreement in 2005, 
foreseeing ‘house and business’ in the site (p. 64) without specifying it very much further. 
In 2004 an indicative plan detailed the outline zoning by specifying a number of around 
400 units (p. 40). However, these documents are of indicative character, which means that 
the Municipality of Groningen could in theory decide to diminish the building possibilities 
without this giving to the landowner the right to compensation for their virtual loss. Finally 
the 2006 Land-use Plan allowed about 430 dwellings. Regarding the future contributions, 
there was no certainty at all, as the documents mentioned above failed to define either specific 
unprofitable elements or any cost allocation principle.
Second variable: Property rights
Property developer Mr. Hollestelle, bought the land and initiated negotiations with the 
municipality in 2000. Hollestelle re-sold the land to commercial developer IBC in 2001, 
and commercial developer Heijmans bought IBC (including the land) in 2002. In 2001 and 
2002 the national average prices of new dwellings increased above inflation at about 6% per 
year. Prices of apartments in the region of Groningen also increased above inflation during 
2003 (4.5%), 2004 (7%) and 2005 (9.5%). It is reasonable to conclude that waiting was 
economically an interesting option. After Heijmans bought IBC in 2002 they decided to 
wait to ‘redefine’ the plan. As a result the plans were re-drafted, which led to considerable 
delay (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 58; Segeren, interview in 2008).The option to wait not only 
delayed regeneration but also lowered public-value capturing. From the beginning of 
negotiations, the developer argued that there was little financial leeway in the project, i.e. 
making it clear to the municipality that there were not many value-capturing possibilities. 
The municipality, which did not have access to the financial calculations of the developer, 
already in the early stages seems to have accepted that it could not ask for large contributions. 
Also, the municipality accepted several cost saving changes in the quality of the public space 
constructed by the developer (Buitenlaar et al., 2008: 113-114). 
Realised public-value capturing
The developer pays part of on-site public infrastructure. The Municipality of Groningen pays 
the renovation of the roads circumscribing the new buildings. In total, about 50% of the 
site will be used for any sort of public infrastructure. The developer provided for free 2/5 of 
this land, the Municipality 3/5 (most of it was already public space). Further, the developer 
makes no other contribution. 
Sources: Google Earth; 2006 Land-use Plan
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The findings in all three countries suggest 
that more certainty beforehand may result 
in less public-value capturing. It seems that 
when municipalities prescribe development 
possibilities early in the development process, 
this might stimulate land price increases 
and might also lead to the loss of a valuable 
negotiation tool. Municipalities might be 
giving away their ‘treasure’: that of being 
the only institution entitled to decide, with 
certain discretionary powers, if, when and 
what is allowed to be built. High land prices 
affect public-value capturing negatively 
because they jeopardise the financial leeway 
to finance public infrastructure. However, it 
was not always possible to measure the actual 
effect of this sub-variable (certainty about 
future building possibilities) in this study, 
mainly because this certainty was similar in 
almost all cases and there were few examples 
to the contrary. The conclusions are thus 
mainly based on reasoning. In addition, 
this sub-variable seems not always to be the 
only determinant as a second sub-variable 
(certainty about future contributions, see 
below) may play a more relevant role. In other 
words, certainty about building possibilities, 
if accompanied by certainty about future 
contributions, does not necessarily influence 
public-value capturing negatively.
Positive effect of certainty about 
contributions
The differences among the countries are larger 
when we look at the second sub-variable, 
certainty about what the landowner will 
have to contribute to public infrastructure. 
In Valencia, in the early stages there is much 
certainty about future contributions. This 
certainty seems to have improved public-value 
capturing (see Figure 11.4). The following 
documents create this certainty:
1. Legally minimum standards, approved 
for each Spanish region (see Box 11.5 for 
the standards in the region of Valencia);
2. Local policy, approved by the 
municipalities (see Box 11.7 for example 
in the Municipality of Valencia);
3. The above-mentioned legally binding 
general land-use plans include location 
and dimensions of main public 
infrastructure (see Figures 11.1 and 
11.4). 
In recent years, English municipalities are 
increasingly creating some certainty through 
the approval of formal policy on planning 
obligations. 
Nowadays, a majority of local authorities has 
enacted such policy (Campbell e.a., 2000: 
760, 763-764; Department for Communities 
and Local Government, 2006: 19-20). This 
policy is mainly of two sorts:
1. Site-specific indicative plans that 
establish the contributions for the 
development in question, i.e. Bristol’s 
1998 Planning Brief (Box 11.3 );
BOX 11.5 EXAMPLES OF LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR RESIDENTIAL SCHEMES IN THE 
1998 REGULATION, REGION OF VALENCIA
t Minimum public space: with a floor space index of one m² floor space per m² land, a 
minimum of 63% of the plan area must be used for public space: 15% for green areas, 
20% for public facilities and 28% for roads;
t Minimum number of plots for public facilities: schemes with more than 8,000 m² floor 
space must provide at least one plot for public facilities.
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Sources: Maps Live; 2003 Detailed Land-use Plan. 
FIGURE 11.4 REGENERATION OF  BENALÚA SUR, ALICANTE, SPAIN
BOX 11.6 REGENERATION OF BENALÚA SUR, ALICANTE, SPAIN - CASE VARIABLES
First variable: flexibility in planning
The 1987 General Plan of the city of Alicante, and its subsequent modification in 1997, 
prescribed detailed regulations for the Benalúa site, for instance the detailed alignment of 
public infrastructure and apartment buildings, and a maximum building volume of 103.670 
m² floor space for a maximum of 742 dwellings. The 2004 Detailed Land-use Plan fulfilled 
all these prescriptions, without modifying them. Thanks to the 1987 and 1997 documents, 
and thanks to the 1998 Regulation, the obligatory contributions were clear beforehand. 
Second variable: Property rights
The 1994 Act might has been relevant here. The owners of about sixty percent of the land 
did join together and undertook initiative submitting the first regeneration plan to the 
Municipality. Even though another three parties submitted alternative plans, the municipality 
ultimately selected the owners’ proposal. Thus, the old voluntary land readjustment regulation 
(previous to the 1994 legal modification, in which compulsory land readjustment was only 
possible when the owners of more than sixty percent of the land supported the plan) would 
have been sufficient. However, a small consultancy company, owner of only about 15% of 
the land, was the first to take the initiative. The fact that it could do so without having the 
support of the other owners may have stimulated them to join the initiative posted by this 
small consultancy company, as they were aware that the municipality could ‘by-pass’ them 
and appoint this small company as the urbanising agent. 
Realised public-value capturing
The developer pays the entire on-site public infrastructure, including the roads, park, public 
space, and a plot for a new school. The school itself will be constructed and paid by the 
respective public body. In total, almost 80% of the land will be used for any kind of public 
infrastructure, and the landowners must provide all this land for free. They will also deliver 
for free a plot of 5.4 ha situated off-site, on which the Municipality intends to construct a 
new highway. There is no direct link between Benalúa and this new highway. The developer 
will in addition construct some pipelines that serve not only the new buildings, but also 
other areas in the City. Finally, the landowners will give for free to the Municipality 
about 10% of the serviced building plots. The Municipality will sell these plots for a low 
price to developers, who must build social housing on them.
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BOX 11.8 EXAMPLE OF STANDARD CONTRIBUTIONS PRESCRIBED IN BRISTOL’S 2005 SPD4 
DOCUMENT
t Affordable housing: in residential developments of 25 or more dwellings or one hectare 
or more in size, a percentage of the total number of units according to local affordable 
housing policy (30% in 2007, red.);
t Educational facilities: in residential developments of 40 or more dwellings ₤9,136 
per additional pupil numbers in excess of the capacity of local nursery and primary 
schools, ₤14,346 per additional pupil of local secondary schools; the developer is 
usually required to pay a sum for the provision of off-site facilities, or in exceptional 
cases to provide these facilities on-site. 
BOX 11.7 CRITERIA FOR THE RE-ZONING OF THE 1988 GENERAL PLAN OF THE CITY OF 
VALENCIA, APPROVED IN 2000, MODIFIED IN 2004
t The re-zoning must improve the urban quality: reducing the total building volume, or 
introducing any other objective improvement.
t Of the total building volume, 20% must be commercial/recreational or affordable 
housing.
t Compensation: for each new m² floor space, one m² land must be reserved for public 
facilities (additional to the minimum obligations established by the legal standards and 
in the General Plan), or 0.5 if the developer uses at least 20% of the building volume 
for affordable housing. These m² of land may also be ceded off-site, or paid in money. 
t If the new dwellings add more than 1,000 inhabitants to the area, landowners have 
to cede at least 5,000 m² land for a park (additional to the legal minimum cessions).
2. Non site-specific, generic policy 
documents that establish standard and 
similar contributions for the whole 
municipality. The approval of these 
generic documents has been stimulated 
in recent years by the central government 
in London. An example of this 
document is Bristol’s Supplementary 
Planning Document Number 4, SPD4, 
adopted in 2005 (see Box 11.8). 
In general for England, there is evidence that 
local authorities that dispose of standard, 
already known charges, are able to gain more 
obligations, in number and in terms of their 
economic value (Department…, 2006: 19, 22, 
27-28, 54). This strengthens the conclusion, 
based on the studied cases, that certainty about 
contributions has a positive effect on public-
value capturing. It is expected that in the next 
years the planning obligations mechanisms 
will play an important role in capturing some 
of the development profit for re-investment 
back into essential infrastructure (Gallent & 
Tewdwr-Jones, 2007: 211-213, 257).
In the Netherlands there is little certainty 
ever, created either through legally binding or 
indicative documents. And if there is some, 
it is to a limited extent. Only in exceptional 
circumstances is the amount of future 
contributions clear before negotiations take 
place or before the price of land is established. 
This uncertainty seems to have a negative 
influence on public-value capturing (see Box 
11.4).
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There are several explanations for the positive 
effect of certainty about contributions. First, 
certainty may have a deflating impact on 
the price of land, as developers do indeed 
take account of future contributions when 
calculating the price to be paid to the 
landowner, and lower land prices augment the 
financial leeway for public-value capturing. 
This explanation fits in with the economic 
explanations of land price mechanisms 
(White, 1986: 104-107; Rowan-Robinson 
& Lloyd, 1988: 128-130; Campbell et.al., 
2000: 769-771). Second, certainty influences 
the negotiations because the obligatory 
contributions serve as starting point, and 
because public officers have a strong policy 
base to require contributions. Tables 11.3 and 
11.4 summarise the findings.
11.5 PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LAND
There is a debate in the Netherlands and Spain 
about property rights in land that has inspired 
the definition of the second variable. The 
debates focus on whether the landowner should 
have the exclusive right to develop his land, 
and whether he/she should be able to exclude 
others from exercising this development right. 
Also, it focuses on the extent that the law 
should be allowed to regulate this right. The 
British nationalisation of development rights 
in 1947 is an important point of reference in 
both countries (CPB, 1999; Priemus & Louw, 
2000, 2003; Korthals Altes and Groetelaers, 
2000; Parejo, 1991; García-Bellido, 1993, 
1994; Roca, 2007).  The similarities between 
the debate in the Netherlands and Spain are 
obvious, e.g. in both countries proposals have 
been made to separate development rights from 
the property rights of the landowner. In 1994 
concrete steps were taken in Spain; the region 
of Valencia adopted new legislation that in 
practice separated infrastructure provision from 
property rights. Today, this innovation has been 
introduced in almost all of the remaining 17 
Spanish regions. Inspired from this legislation, 
this chapter explores the effect of one aspect of 
property rights (i.e. the degree to which public 
bodies depend on landowners to provide the 
infrastructure) on public-value capturing. 
TABLE 11.3 SUMMARY OF DEGREE OF CERTAINTY IN SPAIN (VALENCIA), ENGLAND AND THE 
NETHERLANDS
CERTAINTY BEFOREHAND ABOUT 
BUILDING POSSIBILITIES
CERTAINTY BEFOREHAND ABOUT 
CONTRIBUTIONS
SPAIN (VALENCIA) Always, much certainty Always, much certainty
ENGLAND Sometimes, some certainty Sometimes, some certainty
THE NETHERLANDS Always, some certainty Almost never, and limited certainty
TABLE 11.4 SUMMARY OF THE EFFECT OF CERTAINTY ON PUBLIC-VALUE CAPTURING
CERTAINTY BEFOREHAND ABOUT 
CONTRIBUTIONS
NO CERTAINTY ABOUT FUTURE 
CONTRIBUTIONS
Certainty beforehand 
about building 
possibilities
++ more capturing value increase - less capturing value increase
No certainty about 
future building 
possibilities
++ more capturing value increase + some capturing value increase
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Differences in dependence between public 
and private actors
None of the nine Western European countries 
studied has a full and clear separation of the 
right to develop from property rights in land. 
In all of them, development rights belong to 
the landowner, i.e. the landowner is always 
the only one entitled to build on the land (in 
accordance to the zoning regulations and upon 
obtaining the necessary permits). However, in 
Spain, Germany, France and Sweden planning 
law explicitly refers to providing infrastructure 
as a ´responsibility´ or ´task´ of the public 
bodies, but not of the landowner or the 
developer. 
Having answered the question ‘who owns the 
right to develop’ (the landowners in principle, 
even though in Spain, Germany, France and 
Sweden, law defines infrastructure provision 
as a public task and something differentiated 
from the rest of development rights) was 
however not specific enough for gathering the 
empirical data. Therefore, this chapter focused 
on the power/dependency relationships 
between the involved actors (municipality, 
developer, landowners) in each transaction in 
development processes. Urban development 
is possible only with the following successful 
transactions (Alexander, 2001):
1. Land purchase and assembling 
(obtaining the necessary land);
2. Financing;
3. Land preparation and development 
(infrastructure provision, which results 
in serviced building plots);
4. Land disposition (of serviced building 
plots, ready for construction);
5. Building.
 
Each step implies transactions (of land, of 
money). Infrastructure provision can only 
happen after completing at least the first three 
transactions. It was possible to distinguish 
between England and the Netherlands on 
the one hand and the Spanish region of 
Valencia on the other hand. In England and 
the Netherlands the transactions needed for 
providing infrastructure are very dependent on 
reaching agreements with the landowners. This 
is because none of the actors controls all of the 
necessary resources, i.e. municipalities have a 
monopoly on regulatory powers (zoning plans 
and building permits), but the landowners/
developers control the land and have the 
investment capacity. This mutual dependence 
is very strong; to avoid it, municipalities must 
get heavily and directly involved, in financial 
and organizational terms (by expropriating 
land and constructing infrastructure for 
example). 
On the other hand, in Valencia the 1994 
planning law introduced a fundamental 
change. Before 1994 there was a similar strong 
mutual dependence, but this dependence 
disappeared soon after the introduction of the 
law; municipalities are not dependent anymore 
on reaching agreements with the landowners. 
Besides pre-emption and expropriation, 
Valencian municipalities can opt for 
compulsory land readjustment, without having 
to become directly involved. Landowners can 
choose for voluntary expropriation or can 
participate in the development and share the 
value increase that accrues from re-zoning. If 
they participate, they are obliged by law to 
deliver the land needed for public infrastructure 
and pay to a third party (the urbanising agent) 
a proportional share of the costs of public 
infrastructure. If they choose expropriation, 
the urbanising agent pays the compensation 
and acquires the land. The municipality selects 
in a public tender this urbanising agent, who 
may be a public company but most of the times 
is a commercial developer. After providing the 
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infrastructure, the urbanising agent delivers 
the serviced building parcels to the landowners 
and transfers the public infrastructure free of 
charge to the municipality.
In Valencia the public or private developers 
who provide the infrastructure (the urbanising 
agents) do not necessarily need to own or 
control the land, while in England and the 
Netherlands this is necessary (Muñoz & 
Korthals Altes, 2007). 
Option to wait popular in England and the 
Netherlands
On the one hand, in Valencia there is no 
mutual dependence and landowners do not 
have the option to wait. Although compulsory 
readjustment is not common, it does play an 
important role in dissuading landowners from 
taking actions that may delay development 
(see Figures 11.4, 11.5 and Box 11.9). 
FIGURE 11.5 REGENERATION OF GUILLEM DE 
ANGLESOLA ,VALENCIA, SPAIN
BOX 11.9 REGENERATION OF GUILLEM 
DE ANGLESOLA ,VALENCIA, SPAIN - CASE 
VARIABLES
Second variable: Property rights  
Neither the initiating developer (Proara, 
the one who first submitted a regeneration 
plan), nor the other three developers who 
in the public tender submitted alternative 
plans, were linked to the landownership 
in the area. The possibility of selecting a 
developer without owning land has been 
a crucial factor. As there were hundreds of 
owners (many of them residents or small 
landlords), it seems unlikely that all these 
actors would have agreed on a voluntary 
land readjustment. Therefore, the option 
to ‘by-pass’ the landowners has been a 
crucial factor in redeveloping the site. 
Finally, Proara was selected as the urbanising 
agent and then progressively bought land. 
The landowners had to accept the full 
contributions package, and the urbanizing 
agent accepted additional contributions: 
an important part of the infrastructure 
costs that according to planning law 
should be paid by the landowners, and 
additional compensation to the owners of 
the old deteriorated houses.
Realised  public-value capturing  T h e 
developer pays the entire on-site public 
infrastructure (mainly the new avenue 
cutting the site). In total, 74% of the land 
will be used for public infrastructure, of 
which the landowners provide 2/3 for 
free. The Municipality provides the other 
1/3 (the actual roads). Most of the costs 
and land are meant for the construction 
of a new avenue cutting the site. This 
avenue serves not only this small site, but 
also a much wider area. In addition, the 
developer will build between 30% and 
50% of the dwellings as social houses to 
sell. Sources: Maps Live; 2005 Detailed Land-use Plan. 
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On the other hand, in England and the 
Netherlands landowners have the option to 
oppose the contributions package or other 
municipal requirements and wait. In the 
English and Dutch cases, the option to wait 
was not an exception but rather used quite 
frequently (see Figures 11.2 and 11.3). This 
is not an exception in urban regeneration in 
these countries. 
There are several different motivations for 
landowners and developers choosing the 
option to wait. First, there is the expectation 
that longer negotiations lead to higher profits, 
due to reduced contributions or regular land 
prices increasing over time. This expectation 
makes the option to wait the best rational 
choice from an economic point of view. 
Another motivation to wait is when municipal 
requirements are perceived as endangering the 
financial feasibility of the operation. As we just 
saw, it is not an exception at all that Dutch 
and English developers threaten to withdraw 
the application if the municipality does not 
lower the requirements. It is however difficult 
to assess the importance of this third variable 
(financial leeway of the plan) because of the 
lack of reliable sources. In the Dutch cases, 
following estimates based on information 
given by the developers, the financial leeway 
appears to be very narrow. However, following 
my own estimates, there was room for higher 
contributions (see Table 11.5: posting 8 minus 
postings 1-7). 
To sum up, in the Dutch cases it is not clear 
if the financial margins were so narrow as 
to justify such opposition to the municipal 
requirements. Did developers use the option 
to wait because it was necessary or did they 
abuse this option in order to increase their 
profit margins? In the English cases, following 
my own estimates, the financial margins were 
bigger and allowed for greater contributions. 
Consequences for public-value capturing
In Valencia, landowners and developers do 
not have the option to wait, and therefore 
they cannot refuse the ambitious requirements 
of municipalities. The end result has been a 
great improvement of public infrastructure. 
In England and the Netherlands the option to 
wait has a negative effect; municipalities often 
do not demand high contributions or are often 
forced to lower the contributions package and 
the quality requirements.
 Otherwise they face the risk of not reaching 
an agreement with the landowners/developers, 
thus delaying the development of the area (see 
Figures 11.2 - 11.5). 
Higher development costs in England and 
the Netherlands
This research provided remarkable and 
unexpected findings by uncovering large 
differences in the costs of infrastructure 
provision and plan preparation in the three 
studied countries. Development costs consist 
of:
1. Land prices;
2. The cost of constructing public 
infrastructure; 
3. The costs of preparing plans, studies, 
meetings, tendering the works, etc.;
4. Soil decontamination costs;
5. Compensation costs (compensation to 
existing owners and inhabitants that 
must move and/or lose properties);
6. Contributions to public infrastructure;
7. Real estate development costs (the costs 
of developing and constructing the 
buildings).     
  
The Dutch cases have the highest infrastructure 
provision and plan preparation costs (see Table 
11.5): in Kruidenbuurt and Kop van Oost 
respectively €438 and €368 per m² of new 
public space2, in Stationskwartier the cost was 
2  ‘New public space’ is the surface that becomes redeveloped and 
will be used for public uses. Most of infrastructure provision costs 
relate to the construction of public infrastructure above or under 
this surface.
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much higher, €1,212/m², partially explained 
by the fact that this figure includes the price 
of land, soil decontamination, compensation 
costs and probably contains a hidden profit 
for the municipality. In the English cases the 
infrastructure provision and plan preparation 
costs are €153, €269 and €332 per m². In 
the Valencian cases they are €94, €693, €103 
and €94 per m²; except for the second case 
these figures can be generalised for the entire 
Valencian region (Fernández & Fernández, 
2002: 68-74; Gascó, 2006: 72-76). 
Two Dutch experts confirmed the 
generalisability of the figures for the 
Netherlands, with nuances, by analysing three 
recent urban regeneration cases (see projects 
1, 2 and 3 in Table 11.5). Infrastructure 
provision and plan preparation costs were 
together €352 per m² new public space in 
Project 1 and € 265 in Project 2. Such figures 
are not at all exceptional in urban regeneration 
in the Netherlands. Project 3 (€118 per m² 
new public space) suggests that there are 
exceptions to the general conclusion that these 
costs are much higher in the Netherlands 
than in Valencia (Stauttener and Van Bladel, 
interviews 2008). A possible explanation for 
the high cost of infrastructure provision and 
plan preparation costs in England and the 
Netherlands is that the option to wait has 
an inflationary effect on these costs. Delay 
results in additional studies, meetings, etc., 
increasing the plan preparation costs. In the 
Dutch Projects 1 and 2, plan preparation 
costs are €102 and €56 per m² of new public 
space respectively, while in the Valencian 
cases they are about €18. Unfortunately, it 
was not possible to specify these costs for the 
other Dutch and English cases. Delay and the 
corresponding uncertainties increase the risks, 
which translate into higher infrastructure 
provision costs, e.g. allocating higher reserve 
lines for unexpected expenses, and generating 
higher financial costs (loans for high risk 
projects are expensive, and a longer loan 
period involves higher costs).
In addition, the option to wait can also have 
an inflationary effect on land prices; market 
parties would be more interested in acquiring 
land to acquire a strong negotiating position. 
The findings in the Dutch cases seem to 
support this argument: land was often sold for 
higher than the market price of the former use. 
For example in Kop van Oost the estimated 
market value of the previous use (industrial 
land) was about €3.6m, but in 2001 it was 
sold for around €12m, so when it was sold 
again in 2002 the price must have been even 
higher. Higher land prices are negative for 
public-value capturing because they diminish 
the financial leeway for the developers to 
contribute.
11.6 CONCLUSIONS
There are large differences in public-value 
capturing in urban regeneration between 
England, the Spanish region of Valencia and 
the Netherlands. Public bodies in England and 
especially in Valencia managed: 1) to make 
developers provide the public infrastructure 
(public roads and space, sewerage, public 
facilities and buildings, affordable and social 
housing), either by paying for it or constructing 
it; and also 2) to capture part of the value 
increase that accrues after re-zoning land. 
In the Netherlands public bodies must subsidise 
a large part of the public infrastructure. Since 
Dutch public bodies have been facing severe 
budgetary cuts in the last two decades and since 
they cannot rely on private contributions, the 
quality and quantity of public infrastructure 
in urban development in the Netherlands has 
deteriorated. The experience in England and 
Spain might provide interesting solutions for 
pursuing larger public-value capturing and 
public infrastructure improvements. 
Two approaches can help to improve public-
value capturing. In the first place, the certainty 
or lack of certainty about future contributions 
seems to have a relevant effect on land prices 
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and on the negotiations between local public 
bodies and private parties. Local planning 
bodies can modify the behaviour and profit 
expectations of landowners and real estate 
developers by using their policy-making 
powers to anticipate the contributions that 
market parties should make. The important 
step is for the public bodies to make explicitly 
clear in a public document what they expect, 
with proper argumentation. The experience in 
England and Spain shows the importance of 
central government policy that stimulates local 
public bodies to introduce these measures, for 
example, issuing model documents and giving 
financial stimuli to those local bodies that 
produce value capturing policy.
In the second place, this chapter presented 
evidence that a specific form of shaping 
property rights on land can improve public-
value capturing, i.e. the Valencian land 
readjustment regulation that successfully 
separated infrastructure provision from 
property rights in land. In addition, the 
regulation can also have a deflationary effect 
on the costs for providing infrastructure 
and preparing plans. This supports the idea 
that property law in relation to the goal of 
producing urban space and housing is not only 
a matter of rights; it also involves obligations. 
The adoption of a combined approach to 
property rights and duties, through a land 
readjustment regulation, may help regulate 
the initiatives taken by landowners and 
commercial developers in such a way that they 
fulfill a greater role in the creation of public 
infrastructure. It can also help to overcome 
problems of stagnation in constructing new 
housing, a serious problem that is not limited 
to the Netherlands or the UK but also affects 
numerous other countries, e.g. Sweden. 
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